COSCO SHIPPING Ports is entering a new phase in the development of its global terminal network.

The Hong Kong-listed port operator reported a strong set of interim results for the first half of 2026. Total container throughput rose 7.9% year on year to 80.16 million TEU, equity throughput increased 7.0% to 24.49 million TEU, revenue climbed 12.3% to US$905.3 million, and gross profit increased 9.3% to US$239.5 million. Profit attributable to equity holders reached US$233.7 million, up 28.5%, while the board declared a first interim dividend of HK18.5 cents per share, compared with HK15.1 cents a year earlier.

Yet the significance of the results goes well beyond the headline profit increase. The more important development is the changing composition of COSCO SHIPPING Ports’ growth. Throughput at its terminals in China increased 4.7% in the first half, while overseas throughput surged 18.0% to 21.14 million TEU. Overseas equity throughput also rose 12.4% to 7.58 million TEU. Although overseas terminals currently account for only about 26.4% of group throughput, they generated roughly 55% of the group’s incremental container volumes during the period. Chancay is ramping up, Laem Chabang has entered the reporting perimeter, the new Red Sea Container Terminals facility has commenced operations, while Suez Canal Container Terminal and Kumport both recorded double-digit growth. In other words, years of overseas investment are increasingly becoming visible in actual cargo volumes rather than simply in the size of the asset portfolio.

At the same time, the numbers require a more nuanced reading. Overseas terminals are becoming an increasingly important engine of volume growth, but that does not yet mean that overseas operations have become the principal driver of profit growth. Combined profit from controlled and non-controlled terminals actually declined 3.1% year on year, while the 28.5% increase in attributable profit was materially supported by a US$53.7 million reversal of a historical provision relating to a contractual obligation. Newly commissioned terminals are still going through market development and capacity ramp-up, while geopolitical disruption has had a direct impact on certain assets, most notably Abu Dhabi, where throughput fell 44.3%.

The deeper message from the first-half results is therefore that COSCO SHIPPING Ports is moving beyond the stage of simply building a global portfolio of terminal assets. It is entering a phase in which network integration, terminal-level profitability, cargo connectivity and return on capital will become increasingly important measures of performance.

Beyond 80 Million TEU: The Structure of Growth Matters More Than the Scale

COSCO SHIPPING Ports handled 80.16 million TEU in the first six months of 2026, up from 74.30 million TEU a year earlier, representing an increase of roughly 5.86 million TEU. Within that total, throughput at controlled terminals rose just 2.5% to 16.89 million TEU, while non-controlled terminals expanded 9.4% to 63.26 million TEU, accounting for 78.9% of total group throughput. The same pattern can be seen in equity throughput, where non-controlled terminals grew 10.3% to 14.55 million TEU, compared with 2.6% growth at controlled terminals.

This structure reflects a distinctive feature of COSCO SHIPPING Ports’ global expansion model. The company has not attempted to achieve scale by fully owning or controlling every terminal in its network. Instead, it has built a combination of controlled subsidiaries, joint ventures and minority investments across major Chinese and international gateways. Such a model allows it to gain strategic exposure to a much larger volume base without having to finance 100% of every asset, while still securing long-term positions at critical nodes in global container shipping.

That also means that the company’s performance cannot be assessed solely on headline throughput. Three different indicators matter. Total throughput measures the scale of the network; equity throughput reflects the economic share attributable to COSCO SHIPPING Ports; and terminal profit ultimately determines whether those assets are generating sustainable returns. The 2026 interim results show strong momentum in the first metric, steady growth in the second and a more mixed picture in the third.

Revenue rose 12.3% to US$905.3 million, substantially faster than the 7.9% increase in total throughput. However, cost of sales increased 13.4% to US$665.8 million, slightly faster than revenue, pushing gross margin down from 27.2% to 26.5%. This reflects two parallel forces. Mature terminals such as Piraeus and Tianjin benefited from higher tariffs, improved cargo mix and additional storage revenue, allowing revenue to grow faster than volumes. But newly commissioned terminals and expanding projects are also bringing higher operating expenses, depreciation and financing costs before reaching mature utilization levels.

COSCO SHIPPING Ports is therefore showing the classic characteristics of an infrastructure platform in expansion: the network is getting larger and more valuable, but there remains a time lag between capital deployment, volume ramp-up and the realization of full profitability.

Overseas Throughput Jumps 18% — and Accounts for More Than Half of Incremental Volumes

The most important structural shift in the interim report is the growing contribution from overseas terminals.

Chinese terminals handled 59.02 million TEU, up 4.7%, and still represented 73.6% of group throughput. Overseas terminals handled 21.14 million TEU, up 18.0%, while overseas equity throughput climbed 12.4% to 7.58 million TEU. On an absolute basis, overseas terminals added around 3.23 million TEU compared with the same period last year, versus an increase of approximately 5.86 million TEU for the group as a whole. This means overseas operations contributed roughly 55% of COSCO SHIPPING Ports’ total incremental throughput in the first half.

For years, the company’s overseas strategy was often judged in terms of geographical coverage, the number of international terminals in its portfolio or its strategic footprint along major trade corridors. In 2026, those investments are increasingly showing up in day-to-day operating statistics.

However, the 18% overseas growth rate also needs to be decomposed. It includes both organic growth from existing terminals and a substantial contribution from newly acquired or newly commissioned assets.

The clearest example is Laem Chabang in Thailand. COSCO SHIPPING Ports completed the relevant equity transaction in September 2025 and began including the terminals’ throughput in its reporting from October. In the first half of 2026 alone, Laem Chabang contributed 2.704 million TEU. Red Sea Container Terminals, which commenced operations in January 2026, added another 108,899 TEU.

This distinction matters. Laem Chabang alone accounted for a very large share of the absolute increase in overseas volumes, meaning the headline 18% growth rate partly reflects portfolio expansion and a low comparison base. By 2027, once Laem Chabang has a full-year comparable base and Chancay moves further beyond its initial ramp-up period, overseas growth will increasingly have to come from route attraction, terminal utilization and underlying regional trade growth, rather than from consolidation effects.

A Global Network Under Real-World Stress

The 18% increase in overseas throughput did not come from uniform growth across the portfolio. The terminal-by-terminal figures reveal significant regional divergence.

Suez Canal Container Terminal handled 3.04 million TEU, up 22.9%. Turkey’s Kumport grew 14.6%, Hamburg’s Tollerort terminal increased 6.8%, Antwerp Gateway rose 3.7%, while the company’s Spanish terminals increased 3.7%. Chancay expanded 68.2% from a low base.

In contrast, Piraeus throughput fell 2.9%, Rotterdam’s Euromax declined 10.0%, Vado Gateway dropped 12.9%, and CSP Abu Dhabi Terminal plunged 44.3% to 442,977 TEU as Middle East geopolitical disruption hit operations.

This divergence illustrates the economics of a global port portfolio particularly well. Ships are mobile assets: liner operators can reroute vessels, change port rotations or divert around high-risk areas when geopolitical or operational conditions deteriorate. Terminals are immovable infrastructure. Once billions of dollars have been committed to a port, that asset must continue to operate through regional trade cycles, alliance changes and geopolitical shocks.

For a global terminal operator, resilience therefore cannot mean expecting every port to grow every year. It means building a sufficiently diversified network so that weakness in one region can be offset by expansion elsewhere.

The Middle East crisis in 2026 is providing a real-world stress test of that model. Abu Dhabi throughput has fallen sharply, while Suez Canal Container Terminal, Kumport, Chancay and the newly added Laem Chabang assets are generating growth elsewhere. The value of global diversification is therefore increasingly visible: the network reduces dependence on any single trade lane, country or geopolitical region.

COSCO SHIPPING Ports has explicitly said that, in response to the evolving Middle East situation, it intends to strengthen contingency planning, optimize feeder networks and develop multiple logistics pathways to improve supply-chain resilience.

That points to an important evolution in port competitiveness. In a more stable era of globalization, terminal efficiency and berth productivity were dominant competitive metrics. In an environment characterized by route disruptions, geopolitical fragmentation and sudden shifts in trade flows, the ability to redirect cargo through feeder services, railways, roads, nearby ports and alternative corridors is becoming increasingly important.

Chancay: The “Three Mainline and Five Feeder” Network Matters More Than 200,000 TEU

Among COSCO SHIPPING Ports’ overseas assets, Chancay remains one of the most strategically significant.

The Peruvian terminal handled 201,773 TEU in the first half, up 68.2% year on year. In absolute terms, that is still modest compared with the multi-million-TEU hubs elsewhere in the group. But the more important disclosure is that Chancay has already developed what the company describes as a “three mainline and five feeder” service network.

For a newly developed port, this matters more than early throughput alone.

Physical completion creates capacity; commercial success depends on creating stable cargo flows and liner connectivity. If Chancay were to serve only Peru’s domestic imports and exports, its long-term growth would ultimately be constrained by the size of the local economy. The broader strategic proposition has always been to use Chancay’s deepwater characteristics and direct Asia–South America services to build it into a regional gateway for the west coast of South America.

That requires several stages of development: first, establishing regular China–Peru deepsea services capable of supporting large container ships; second, creating a feeder network to aggregate cargo from neighboring coastal markets; and third, extending inland through logistics parks, highways, railways and other hinterland infrastructure.

The “three mainline and five feeder” structure suggests that this process is already moving from physical infrastructure into network formation.

This is where COSCO SHIPPING Ports enjoys a strategic advantage over a standalone terminal operator. It is part of a group that controls one of the world’s largest liner networks. Once a terminal has been built, COSCO SHIPPING’s own ships and services can provide an initial base of calls and cargo, while feeder connectivity can gradually expand the hinterland.

The company also highlighted strengthening trade between China and emerging markets such as ASEAN and Latin America, including the growing export share of electric vehicles, lithium batteries and photovoltaic products. That trend closely aligns with the positioning of assets such as Chancay and Laem Chabang: their long-term value increasingly lies in occupying strategic nodes along the trade corridors where future cargo growth is expected to emerge.

Laem Chabang Adds 2.7 Million TEU — Southeast Asia Becomes a Bigger Part of the Network

If Chancay represents COSCO SHIPPING Ports’ attempt to establish a new growth hub in Latin America, Laem Chabang represents another dimension of the strategy: gaining exposure to the continuing reconfiguration of manufacturing and trade in Southeast Asia.

The Laem Chabang terminals contributed 2.704 million TEU in the first half of 2026. In absolute terms, this was already larger than Piraeus’ 1.995 million TEU, Antwerp Gateway’s 1.331 million TEU and Tollerort’s 635,500 TEU, and slightly above the 2.623 million TEU handled by COSCO-PSA Terminal in Singapore.

Because Laem Chabang had no comparable figure in the first half of 2025, its contribution materially boosts the headline overseas growth rate. But it also demonstrates how an investment in an established terminal can immediately add millions of TEU of cargo exposure to a global network.

This reveals two distinct expansion models being used by COSCO SHIPPING Ports.

One is greenfield strategic development, represented by Chancay: invest in a future trade corridor, build a deepwater hub and cultivate volumes over time.

The other is acquiring or investing in mature gateways, represented by Laem Chabang: enter an existing cargo ecosystem and immediately gain customers, vessel calls and established trade volumes.

The company’s own investment framework reflects that distinction. It plans to seek controlling stakes in strategic hubs while taking equity positions in important gateway ports where market conditions justify it.

That provides a more disciplined framework for the next stage of overseas expansion. Assets capable of reshaping the group’s network and functioning as regional transshipment hubs may justify greater control, while large mature gateways may deliver sufficient strategic value through minority or joint-venture stakes without requiring the capital needed for full ownership.

The 28.5% Profit Increase Comes With an Important Accounting Qualification

The most eye-catching financial figure in the interim report is the 28.5% increase in attributable profit to US$233.7 million. But that number needs to be understood carefully.

Combined profit from controlled and non-controlled terminals actually declined 3.1% to US$234.2 million. Controlled terminal profit fell 2.4% to US$61.7 million, while non-controlled terminal profit declined 3.4% to US$172.5 million. Several mature assets performed well, including Piraeus, Xiamen Ocean Gate, Guangzhou Nansha and Tianjin Container Terminal, but the benefits were offset by newly commissioned terminals still in ramp-up and lower profit contributions from certain overseas non-controlled assets.

At the same time, net other operating income increased sharply from US$4.27 million to US$63.38 million, largely because COSCO SHIPPING Ports reversed a previously recognized provision related to a contractual obligation after reaching an agreement with the relevant parties. The reversal contributed US$53.7 million.

The absolute year-on-year increase in attributable profit was approximately US$51.9 million.

Because the provision reversal is a pre-tax item, it would be incorrect to simply subtract it dollar-for-dollar from attributable net profit without further tax information. But the scale is clear: the US$53.7 million reversal is roughly comparable to the entire year-on-year increase in attributable profit.

The reported 28.5% increase is therefore a valid statutory accounting result, but it should not be interpreted as evidence that underlying terminal operating profitability increased by the same amount.

The more useful reading is that COSCO SHIPPING Ports delivered strong volume growth, improving performance at several mature terminals and continuing portfolio expansion, while newly commissioned assets and overseas weakness still limited underlying terminal profit growth.

That distinction will become increasingly important over the next several reporting periods. As Chancay, Laem Chabang and Red Sea Container Terminals move toward more mature utilization levels, investors will increasingly look for evidence that additional containers are being converted into sustainable EBIT, equity earnings and cash flow.

Piraeus Shows Why Throughput Alone Does Not Measure Port Quality

Piraeus provides a particularly useful example of why terminal economics cannot be judged solely by container volumes.

Its throughput fell 2.9% to 1.995 million TEU in the first half amid weaker Mediterranean demand and adverse weather. Yet revenue increased 7.1% to US$190.3 million, while profit rose from US$19.3 million to US$24.9 million, an increase of roughly 29%.

The pattern — lower volumes but higher revenue and profit — reflects the multiple variables that determine terminal profitability. Tariffs, cargo mix, transshipment versus gateway volumes, storage income, service offerings, productivity and contractual structures can all matter as much as headline TEU.

COSCO SHIPPING Ports specifically attributed Piraeus’ revenue improvement to higher tariffs. Tianjin benefited from both higher tariffs and storage income, while Guangzhou Nansha’s revenue growth was supported by higher throughput and storage revenue.

For mature terminals, this is an important part of the group’s next growth phase. Adding another million TEU often requires more cranes, yard space, berths and capital expenditure. Improving the revenue and profit generated by the existing 80-million-TEU network through automation, cargo mix, pricing and integrated logistics can produce returns without requiring an equivalent increase in physical capacity.

The next phase of value creation is therefore likely to come from both more containers and more value per container.

Expanding the Network While Deleveraging the Balance Sheet

The balance sheet provides another important signal.

At the end of June, COSCO SHIPPING Ports’ total outstanding borrowings had fallen from US$3.239 billion at the end of 2025 to US$3.008 billion, while cash stood at approximately US$1.357 billion. Net debt-to-equity declined from 25.1% to 20.8%, while interest coverage improved from 5.7 times to 6.2 times. The group also had US$889.9 million of committed but undrawn banking facilities.

Financing costs provide another useful indicator. Although reported finance costs increased as newly commissioned terminals moved into operation and some previously capitalized interest began flowing through the income statement, COSCO SHIPPING Ports reduced its average bank borrowing cost from 4.70% to 3.98% through refinancing, debt optimization and repayment of higher-cost borrowings.

The company is therefore pursuing two objectives simultaneously: continuing to expand its international footprint while strengthening the balance sheet.

For a capital-intensive infrastructure group, that matters. Large terminal projects can take years between initial investment and mature cash generation. Reducing leverage and financing costs as the previous investment cycle moves into operation creates capacity to act when new port investment opportunities emerge.

Operating cash flow does deserve continued attention. Net cash generated from operations declined from US$299.3 million to US$275.0 million in the first half. As more new overseas assets enter the portfolio, the ability to convert throughput and accounting earnings into recurring cash flow will become an increasingly important measure of investment quality.

From a Collection of Ports to a Connected Global Network

The clearest phrase in COSCO SHIPPING Ports’ outlook may be its ambition to connect individual terminals into an integrated network.

The company said it plans to accelerate investment in emerging markets, regional markets and third-country markets, seek control of strategic hubs, take stakes in important gateway ports where appropriate, improve mainline and feeder connectivity, and develop logistics parks and supply-chain businesses behind its terminals.

This represents a significant evolution in strategy.

Historically, global terminal competition was largely about capacity, berths and ownership positions. But for a terminal operator embedded within one of the world’s largest shipping groups, an isolated port has limited strategic value compared with a port connected to a wider system of deepsea services, feeders, railways, roads, inland depots, warehouses and logistics parks.

Chancay’s “three mainline and five feeder” structure is an early example.

If COSCO SHIPPING can increasingly connect Chinese gateway ports with Chancay and the west coast of South America, link Laem Chabang with Southeast Asia’s manufacturing clusters, and further integrate Piraeus with European inland logistics and rail networks, the commercial proposition goes far beyond handling a container once at a quay.

COSCO SHIPPING Ports has already stated that it intends to extend traditional terminal operations into integrated logistics services and develop “shipping + ports + logistics” products, while continuing investment in automation, artificial intelligence, data integration, clean energy and green-fuel supply chains.

The business model is therefore expanding in two directions simultaneously.

Horizontally, it is moving from individual terminal assets toward a global port network.

Vertically, it is moving from cargo handling toward logistics parks, warehousing, feeder transportation, inland connectivity and supply-chain services.

When those two dimensions are combined, a terminal becomes more than infrastructure. It becomes a node within a much larger system for organizing global cargo flows.

Overseas Growth Is Only the First Step

COSCO SHIPPING Ports’ first-half results are clearly strong: throughput exceeded 80 million TEU, revenue surpassed US$900 million, attributable profit reached nearly US$234 million and overseas volumes increased 18%.

But the next phase of the story will be more demanding than simply adding assets or containers.

Chancay shows that new strategic hubs are beginning to establish cargo and route networks. Laem Chabang demonstrates how investment in mature terminals can rapidly add scale in Southeast Asia. Suez Canal Container Terminal and Kumport demonstrate resilience in important regional markets. Abu Dhabi’s 44.3% decline shows how directly global infrastructure portfolios can be exposed to geopolitical disruption. Piraeus, meanwhile, demonstrates that mature terminals can still create substantial value through pricing, cargo mix and operating efficiency even when volumes decline.

At the same time, the US$53.7 million provision reversal behind part of the 28.5% net-profit growth and the 3.1% decline in combined terminal profit establish a clear benchmark for the next several reporting periods: newly added throughput must increasingly translate into recurring operating earnings and cash flow.

COSCO SHIPPING Ports itself has set out the direction. It intends to strengthen strategic hubs including Wuhan, Piraeus, Abu Dhabi and Chancay, continue expanding into emerging and third-country markets, and connect terminals with feeder services, logistics parks and wider supply-chain infrastructure.

That suggests the company is moving from a phase of global asset deployment to global network operation.

For the wider COSCO SHIPPING group, the implications are significant. Shipping remains highly cyclical: vessels can generate extraordinary returns when freight markets tighten, but earnings can also fall rapidly when capacity outpaces demand. Ports, logistics parks and supply-chain infrastructure operate on longer investment cycles and can create deeper network stickiness.

If vessels, terminals, railways, roads, warehousing and logistics services can increasingly be integrated into a single system, COSCO SHIPPING will gain something more valuable than additional terminal handling income: it will gain greater capacity to organize, channel and retain global cargo flows.

That is ultimately the most important takeaway from COSCO SHIPPING Ports’ first half of 2026.

Overseas terminals are already becoming one of the principal sources of incremental cargo growth. The next challenge is to turn overseas asset growth into network value — and then convert that network value into sustainable earnings and cash flow.