Five-year-old VLCCs are valued at around $210 million, compared with $130 million for newbuildings delivering in 2029. The gap reflects the value of accessing today’s earnings—and the risk of paying for income that may not last.

A ten-year-old very large crude carrier (VLCC) valued at $180 million costs roughly $50 million more than a newbuilding ordered for delivery in 2029. For a five-year-old vessel, the premium rises to about $80 million.

Those indicative prices, published by Poten & Partners in an October 18 analysis, illustrate how strongly delivery timing is influencing tanker asset values. Buyers are paying substantially more for ships that can enter service sooner, despite their shorter remaining operating lives.

The commercial calculation extends beyond the purchase price. A newbuilding offers a longer service life and potentially better efficiency, but an existing vessel offers access to earnings during the years its replacement would spend under construction.

The value of earlier delivery

Poten’s October assessment shows the scale of the gap across different vessel ages:

Source: Poten & Partners analysis published October 18, 2026. Premiums calculated from the rounded values shown. These are indicative assessments, not confirmed transaction prices. A prompt-delivery resale is a separate category from an older secondhand vessel.

The inversion has also reached older tonnage. In an October 16 analysis, Veson Nautical reported that a 310,000-dwt, fifteen-year-old VLCC was valued at $139.2 million at the end of September, slightly above its corresponding newbuilding assessment of $138.7 million. The company identified exceptional earnings linked to disruption in the Strait of Hormuz as the principal driver of demand for existing vessels.

These assessments come from different providers and should be read within their respective dates and methodologies. Both, however, point to the same market dynamic: immediate earning capacity is commanding a substantial premium.

Chinese newbuilding contracts show the alternative

A recent agreement by Scorpio Tankers provides a concrete example of the price and delivery schedule available to buyers willing to wait.

On September 29, the company announced agreements to purchase two scrubber-fitted VLCC newbuildings for $135 million each. The vessels are to be constructed at Hengli Shipbuilding (Dalian) Co., Ltd., in northeastern China, with deliveries expected in September and October 2028.

For Scorpio, the contracts secure future capacity at a price below the October assessments for five- and ten-year-old vessels. They do not, however, provide ships to trade during the intervening period.

That distinction matters to an owner seeking immediate exposure to freight earnings or capacity to fulfil transportation commitments. Waiting may mean foregoing profitable voyages or chartering another vessel until the newbuilding arrives.

A lower contract price therefore does not necessarily translate into a lower overall cost of meeting a near-term shipping requirement.

Why high prices do not guarantee willing sellers

The supply of ships available for purchase is narrower than the fleet itself.

Delivery location, technical condition, existing employment, insurance arrangements and charterer acceptance all affect whether a vessel meets a buyer’s requirements. Two ships of similar age and size may offer materially different opportunities for immediate employment.

Strong freight earnings also raise the seller’s reservation price. An owner disposing of a vessel gives up the income it could generate before a replacement becomes available.

Poten noted that wide bid-ask spreads were limiting completed transactions, despite extensive market speculation. Owners benefiting from strong earnings had little incentive to sell quickly, particularly when they expected asset values to rise further.

The resulting tension can push indicative values higher without producing a corresponding increase in completed sales. Transaction volumes and delivery terms are therefore important alongside headline prices when assessing the strength of the market.

Buying earning capacity—or selling it

The same vessel can have a different value to different owners.

A buyer with committed cargo may prioritise control over transportation. A spot-market operator may focus on the earnings available after delivery. An existing owner can compare those prospective returns with the cash available from selling.

Frontline demonstrated the seller’s side of that calculation on August 4, when it announced an agreement to sell two 2017-built VLCCs for a combined $270 million, equivalent to $135 million per vessel.

At the time, Frontline expected approximately $179 million in net cash proceeds after repayment of vessel debt. Subject to completion, its board planned to distribute those proceeds through a special dividend.

Such transactions transfer future operating opportunities to the buyer while allowing the seller to realise asset value. They need not imply that one party is bullish and the other bearish: fleet renewal, financing, shareholder distributions and existing commercial commitments can all influence the decision.

The premium must survive a cash-flow test

The economic case for buying an older ship at more than newbuilding cost depends on the income it can generate before the alternatives become available.

That calculation requires more than multiplying a headline daily rate by a year’s trading days. Ballast voyages, waiting time, maintenance and the timing of subsequent fixtures affect realised earnings.

Time-charter equivalent earnings also differ from net profit. Although TCE deducts voyage expenses, owners still face operating costs, financing charges and other expenditure.

Age continues to matter after the acquisition. A fifteen-year-old vessel bought today will be seventeen when a newbuilding delivering in two years enters service. A meaningful comparison must account for both ships’ cash flows and values over a common investment horizon, including drydocking requirements and eventual resale proceeds.

Employment arrangements can materially change the risk. A buyer with an agreed charter has a different earnings basis from one relying entirely on future spot fixtures, although counterparty and operating risks remain.

Paying back the purchase-price premium is consequently only part of the assessment. The earlier earnings must also compensate for differences in remaining life, efficiency, maintenance and residual value.

Today’s premiums can encourage tomorrow’s supply

Elevated secondhand values make newbuilding contracts more attractive to owners able to wait.

But the supply response arrives with a delay. Investment decisions made during a strong freight market add ships several years later, when the conditions supporting those decisions may have changed.

High earnings can also encourage owners to retain older vessels. If new ships arrive while the vessels they were intended to replace remain in service, fleet renewal can temporarily become fleet expansion.

This creates a timing risk across the market. Existing ships command premiums because capacity is valuable now; the orders encouraged by those premiums increase capacity later.

For buyers of expensive secondhand VLCCs, the decisive measure will be the cash generated between taking delivery and any subsequent market adjustment. Earlier delivery has a price. Whether that price proves justified depends on the earnings actually captured.