【船长经验】如何安全穿越红海和亚丁湾？

2024-10-09 09:34来源： 信德海事网

安全穿越亚丁湾和红海高风险区

SAFETY TRANSIT THE HRA IN GULF OF ADEN ANDRED SEA

李晓旭船长

亚丁湾GULF OF ADEN和红海RED SEA区域,地理位置十分重要，是连接亚洲和欧洲海上贸易的大动脉，维系者两大洲的文化交流。但在近几十年来一直受到海盗袭扰，是IMO组织和相关保险协会划定的高风险区HRA。而近期胡赛武装针对经过此区域凡是和以色列、美国和英国有相关联的船舶的频繁武装袭击事件更是把亚丁湾GULF OF ADEN和红海RED SEA区域的航行风险的负面影响极大扩展化。使得很多从事从亚洲到欧洲往返贸易航线的船舶本来可以抄近路过苏伊士运河，现在不得不绕行到南非沿岸通行，增加了航运成本，影响了全球自由贸易。导致对于作为实际船上工作者的广大船员兄弟们，时刻面临着潜在的生命危险，更是一种考验和挑战。

所幸的是，相关国际组织已经积极介入，包括咱们中国在内的主要国家都在此区域里部署了军舰，新成立的“繁荣卫士PROSPERITY GUARDIAN”特别行动也在此区域广泛展开，共同参与维护亚丁湾GULF OF ADEN和红海RED SEA区域的航行安全，尽量把对船舶和船员的风险控制在可控的范围内。而为了船舶和船员能顺利通过高风险区，各个船公司也都积极采取措施，通过实时监控船舶位置信息、派遣安保人员武装护航、船舶自身加强防护措施、船员部积极安抚和疏导船员心理等等一系列方法。

以及BIMCO/ICS/IMCA/INTERCARGO等国际主要组织根据最新区域形势及对相关经验的总结，提出了很多可行性的考虑，进一步增加了安全穿越亚丁湾GULF OF ADEN和红海RED SEA区域的信心和保障。

要安全通过亚丁湾GULF OF ADEN和红海RED SEA区域，首先要了解特定区域内的胡赛武装针对的目标考虑：

●Target Selection CONSIDERATIONS 目标选择考虑

The Houthi forces appear to be threatening vessels they believe have affiliation / links with Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom. 胡赛武装显然会威胁那些他们相信和以色列、英国和美国有关联的船舶。

The accuracy of information used by the Houthi forces is uncertain, and links between attacked vessels and the states they claim to target is unclear. All ships transiting this area should remain vigilant, as there is potential for collateral damage from unintended strikes.

被胡赛武装使用的信息准确性不确定，受袭击船舶和他们声称目标国家之间的联系不明。所有穿越此区域的船舶应该保持警觉，因为由于他们没有目的的袭击会造成潜在的连带损伤。

要安全通过亚丁湾GULF OF ADEN和红海RED SEA区域，其次要了解特定区域内的航线和航次计划的考虑：

●ROUTING CONSIDERATIONS 航线考虑

It should be noted that the Bab el Mandeb Strait is narrow and when passing north bound, ships within the Traffic Separation Scheme could be no more than seven nautical miles from the Yemeni coastline.

应该留意到Bab el Mandeb海峡是狭窄的，当船舶在北部交通定线制航行时可能距离也门沿岸不到7海里。

The Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC) remains unchanged. The MSTC is the amalgamation of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), the Bab el Mandeb Traffic Separation Scheme and the Traffic Separation Scheme West of Hanish Islands, and a two-way route directly connecting the IRTC and the Bab el Mandeb Traffic separation Scheme.

海上安全穿越角(MSTC)范围保持不变，MSTC合并了国际推荐的穿越角(IRTC)、Bab el Mandeb及Hanish Islands以西的交通分隔定线制以及直接连接IRTC 和 Bab el Mandeb交通分隔定线制的双向航路。

Ship owners, operators, managers, and staff should regularly evaluate the risks to their ships, including navigation and collision avoidance, and plan routes accordingly. The consequences of turning off sensors such as AIS, LRIT, and especially radars should be carefully assessed.

船东、操作者、管理者及员工都应该定期评估对船舶的风险，包括航行和避碰以相应的规划航线。关闭传感器如AIS, LRIT特别是雷达应该谨慎的评估。

●VOYAGE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 航次计划考虑

Ship operators which have called, or plan to call, at Israeli ports should limit information access. Published information could be used by Houthi forces. 已经靠泊或者计划靠泊以色列的船舶操作者应该限制公布的信息可能被胡赛武装获取以利用。

Ship owners and operators who have recently acquired a vessel from an Israeli-associated company should ensure vessel systems, e.g.: AIS, properly reflect updated information. Outdated information has caused vessels to be attacked.

船东及操作者如果最近获取了和以色列相关公司有关联的船舶，应该确保船上如AIS等系统适当的反映更新信息，过时的（和以色列相关）信息会造成船舶被袭击。

As explained in BMP 5, ships planning a passage through the Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden should conduct a thorough ship and voyage-specific threat and risk assessment considering any additional advice from their flag State. These assessments should include input from official sources, such as UKMTO, and relevant information such as operation specifics, shipping associations guidance, ownership details, and trading history of the ship in the last 3 years that could impact decision making.

根据BMP 5里的解释，计划航线通过南部红海和亚丁湾的船舶应该考虑到船旗国的额外建议进行全面、特定航程的威胁和风险评估。风险评估应该包括可能影响决定的如UKMTO官方信息和特别操作、航运有关指导，船东细节和最近3年船舶的贸易历史记录。

要安全通过亚丁湾GULF OF ADEN和红海RED SEA区域，还有要了解特定区域的威胁：

●THREAT CONSIDERATIONS 威胁考虑

Threats to vessels include anti-ship missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, water-borne improvised explosive devices (WBIED), and drones. Mines are near entrances to Houthicontrolled ports, and on rare occasions, those mines that have become detached from their tether, have drift ed into the traffic lanes. Most recently, unmanned undersea vehicles have been reported, but no vessel has been attacked using these.

包括反舰导弹、弹道导弹、水面临时爆炸装置和无人艇/无人机等。水雷布置在胡赛控制的港口入口附近。极少情况下这些水雷会脱离系绳从而漂入航道。最近，无人水下艇有报道，但还没有船被这些袭击过。

The current maritime threat is greater where Houthi forces are present, in the vicinity of the Yemeni Red Sea coastline. However, it should be noted that Houthi forces have demonstrated their ability to target and attack ships in the Gulf of Aden as far as one hundred nautical miles from the coast. The threat level to ships with Israeli, United Kingdom and United States interests remains high. However, all owners, operators, and crews should be cognisant their vessel could be misidentified and understand their risk of collateral damage.

Visually detecting and classifying small contacts at night, such as a water-borne improvised explosive devices (WBIED), remains a challenge. attacks using drones and anti-ship missiles have been conducted during hours of darkness. Maintaining lookouts during the entire passage, regardless of timing, is necessary.

夜间对视觉探测和区别如水面临时爆炸装置小的目标是一个挑战，要警觉利用无人机和反舰导弹在夜间进行袭击，无论何时整个航程保持正规瞭望都是必须的。

Although the possibility of an airborne attack from helicopters during darkness exists, it is more significant during daylight hours.

尽管在夜间来自直升机从天上攻击的可能性存在，但白天这种可能性影响更加显著。

要安全通过亚丁湾GULF OF ADEN和红海RED SEA区域，再者要选择好通过时机：

Consideration of Day or Night transit白天和黑夜通过考虑.

Timings and navigation of SRS transit remain the vessel Master’s esponsibility. Based on analysis of Houthi activity, it appears that UAVs are generally active during daylight hours. Transiting through the area to the west of Al Hudaydah during the hours of darkness may reduce the threat from UAV attack or frustrate efforts to target MV with missile systems. Although the detection of waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIED) at night is difficult, it is also difficult for the Houthis to effectively direct them towards moving targets without visually identifying them.

要安全通过亚丁湾GULF OF ADEN和红海RED SEA区域，也要明确AIS等传感器的使用：

Consideration Use of sensor such as AIS 传感器如AIS的使用

Adherence to IMO AIS guidance / regulations remains the responsibility of the Ship Manger and Master. Ships with AIS switched on and off have been attacked. Switching off AIS makes it marginally more difficult to track or target a ship but may also hinder the ability of the military to provide support or direct contact.

保持遵守IMO AIS 导则/规定的船舶管理者和船长的责任。AIS开启和关闭的船舶都被袭击过。关闭AIS使得船舶更加困难的被跟踪或瞄准但也限制了联盟军队提供支持或者直接能联系的能力。

Ships with AIS powered on, as well as off, have been attacked. Turning off AIS makes it marginally more difficult to track a ship but may also hinder the ability of the military to provide support or direct contact. International Maritime Organization (IMO) Circular A1106(29) para 22 outlines the use of AIS. It states that, “If the master believes that the continual operation of AIS might compromise the safety and security of his/her ship or where security incidents are imminent, the AIS may be switched off.” Limiting the information in AIS data fields or switching off AIS could make a ship harder to locate but it is unlikely to prevent an attack. Limiting AIS data to the mandatory fields and omitting the next port of call (NPOC) could be considered.

AIS开和关的船舶都被袭击过。船舶关闭AIS能极少并困难的被跟踪到但也会阻碍海军提供支持或者直接联系到的能力。(IMO)通函（ Circular A1106(29)） 22节（para 22 ）概述了 AIS的使用描述；“如果船长相信程序开启AIS可能危害安全和保护船舶，或者保安事件迫在眉睫，AIS可以被关闭”。限制AIS数据栏信息或者关闭AIS也会使船舶很难被定位但不可能阻止被袭击。对强制填写栏AIS数据的限制和忽略下一港信息也是可以考虑的。

要安全通过亚丁湾GULF OF ADEN和红海RED SEA区域，更要知道面对威胁时船舶自身加强及应对的策略：

VESSEL HARDENING CONSIDERATIONS 船舶加强考虑

Hardening measures are described in BMP5 and advice on the website www.maritimeglobalsecurity.orgcan be applied in areas of the ship where insertion of armed men by helicopter may be likely. The use of citadels / safe areas has proven to be successful in preventing the hijackers from taking over the control of the ships. This has also provided valuable time for the Naval vessels within the areas to arrive for assistance. Use of citadel requires thorough preparation and understanding of advantages and pitfalls – the guidelines in BMP5 applies.

在此区域可能会被直升机投放武装人员的船舶其按照BMP5以及网站www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org里所描述的加强措施能被适用。安全舱/安全区在防止劫持者接管控制船舶方面被证明是成功的，同时也为本地区军舰到来帮助提供了宝贵的时间。安全舱的使用按BMP5要求全面的准备和对安全舱优、劣势的理解。

VESSEL SELF DEAL WITH CONSIDERATIONS船舶自身应对考虑

If contacted on VHF by “Yemeni Navy” and instructed to alter course to Al Hudaydah or another location on the NW coast of Yemen:

如果被“也门海军”高频联系，下指令改向去Al Hudaydah或也门西北沿岸的其它位置：

 -Ignore the VHF call and continue passage if safe to do so.

如果这样做安全可以忽略这个高频呼叫，继续穿越。

 -Call for coalition warship on VHF Channel 16, inform them of your location, situation, state your intentions and seek advice.

16频道呼叫联合舰队，通知他们你船的位置，情况，表明你的意图和寻求指导。

-Describe incident in movement reporting to UKMTO and NAVCENT NCAGS.

描述事件经过，报告给UKMTO 和NAVCENT NCAGS.

要安全通过亚丁湾GULF OF ADEN和红海RED SEA区域，最后关键要和相关组织保持沟通和联系，以便及时得到支持：

REPORTING CONSIDERATIONS报告考虑

US Naval Forces, Central Command (NAVCENT) and the Combined Maritime Forces overseeing Operation PROSPERITY GUARDIAN have advised they regard the threat from attack by Houthi forces to merchant ships in Southern Red Sea between latitudes 12° N and 16° N to be very high, especially to ships with affiliation / links with Israel, US, and UK.

美国海军指挥中心和联合海上监视“繁荣卫士”行动组告知关于在经度12度和16度以北之间的南部红海来自胡赛武装威胁非常高，特别是和以色列、美国和英国有关联的船舶。

In the event of any incident, suspicious activity, or concern:

一旦任何事件、可疑活动或相关情况发生：

报告任何可疑事件给UKMTO

-If under attack, please contact US Naval Forces maritime operations centre in Bahrain directly on +973 1785 3879

如果受到袭击，联系在巴林Bahrain美国海军海上行动中心

当穿越高危险区域，位置报告考虑包括NAVCENT NCAGS，特别是增加报告小时次数。